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Abstract-We are engaged in a long-term research project that has the ultimate aim of describing a 
mechanism that can partake in an extended English dialogue on some reasonably well specified range of 
topics. The fundamental ssumption in this project is that conversants in a dialogue are constantly 
recognizing and monitoring the goals of the other participants. To do this, they must have a rich body of 
knowledge about he topic. about he goals and beliefs of the other participants, and about he structure of 
dialogues in general. 
This paper described progress made towards these goals and outlines the current research areas in 
which the project is focused. It describes the basic theory underlying our work and an initial system built 
according to this theory. It then considers ome deficiencies in this system built according to this theory. It 
then considers ome deficiencies in this system and describes the new system, called ARGOT, currently 
under development. Finally. various pecific research efforts within the group are described. 
1. BACKGROUND 
Most current natural anguage understanding systems do not engage in a dialogue in any general 
sense. The “conversations” with these systems consist of a series of single question/answer 
pairs that are analyzed without any consideration of the user’s overall goals. Knowledge of the 
inter-relations between succeeding questions is very limited, typically providing a mechanism 
for resolving anaphoric reference and possibly some forms of ellipsis. There is no sense of a 
continuing interaction in which a topic is developed and tasks are accomplished. 
Some story comprehension systems (e.g. [l-3]) analyze the intentions of characters in the 
story being understood, and answer questions about these characters’ goals. But these tech- 
niques are not used to analyze the questioner’s intent, or to make the system an active 
participant in the question answering dialogue that tests the system’s comprehension of the 
story. 
Consider Dialogue 1. a sample fragment of a dialogue that serves to motivate our work. This 
is a slightly cleaned up version of an actual dialogue between a computer operator and a user 
communicating via terminals. 
(I) User: Could you mount a magtape for me? 
(2) It’s tape xxx. 
(3) No ring, please. 
(4) Can you do it in five minutes? 
(5) System: Sorry. we are not allowed to mount hat magtape, you will have to talk to [Operator yyy] about it. 
(6) User: How about ape zzz? 
Dialogue 1. 
We are building a computer system called ARGOT that plays the role of the operator in 
extended dialogues uch as the above. This dialogue illustrates ome of the many issues that 
must be addressed in building such a system. For instance, the first utterance, taken literally, is 
a query about the system’s (i.e. the operator’s) abilities. In this dialogue, however, the user 
intends it as part of a request o mount a particular magtape. Utterance (2) identifies the tape in 
question, and the third and fourth add constraints on how the requested mounting is supposed 
to be done. These four utterances, taken as a unit, can be summarized as a single request o 
mount a particular magtape with no ring within five minutes. 
Furthermore. once the above is inferred, the system generates an answer (5) that not only 
denies the request but provides additional information that may be helpful to the user. The 
operator believes that talking to the other operator will be of use to the user because he has 
recognized the user’s goal of getting a tape mounted. Utterance (6) taken in isolation is 
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meaningless; however, in the context of the entire dialogue, it can be seen as an attempt o 
modify the original request by changing the tape to be mounted. 
Another problem facing the system is deciding when to speak. In another dialogue the user 
might not have provided the additional information (such as whether to use a ring) in later 
utterances, and the system would have had to ask the user for clarification. 
We are currently building a system that provides some answer to each of the above 
difficulties. It is based on the following assumptions: 
-The participants in the dialogue are goal-directed reasoning systems that can perform both 
physical actions (including linguistic communication) and mental actions such as inference. 
-Much of language arises in an attempt o achieve some goal (e.g. obtain information, get 
the other to do some task). 
-Each participant attempts to understand the other’s utterances in part by recognizing the 
goals that motivated them. They mutually develop a common base of knowledge about the task 
under discussion as the dialogue progresses. 
-A large part of the cooperative behavior observed between the participants occurs because 
one participant accepts a goal of the other as his or her own goal. 
In order to develop this model further we need to investigate the nature of the goals and 
actions in such a setting. This is not the place to examine such issues in detail (see [4]), but a brief 
summary is necessary to understand the remainder of the paper. 
Most goals in this setting involve acquiring beliefs and influencing other’s beliefs and goals. 
These goals are typically achieved using linguistic actions (speech acts) such as informing, 
requesting, warning, etc. Speech acts are defined by specifying the prerequisites and efiects which 
typically are conditions on the beliefs of the speaker and hearer. 
To give an idea of the necessity for this analysis, consider a set of situations in which two 
agents, S and H, discuss a secret. The situations differ only in what the agents know about each 
other’s knowledge of the secret. In each, we shall consider the plausible interpretations of the 
utterance “Do you know the secret?” 
Setting 1. If S knows the secret and believes that H doesn’t know the secret, then “Do you 
know the secret?” is probably an offer to tell H the secret. 
Setting 2. If S doesn’t know the secret and believes that H does know the secret, then “Do 
you know the secret?” is probably a request that H tell S the secret. 
Setting 3. If S knows the secret and doesn’t know if H knows the secret, then “Do you 
know the secret?” is probably either a literal yes/no question or a conditional offer to tell H the 
secret. 
The only changes in the above settings involves S’s and H’s beliefs about each other. The 
interpretations of the utterance arise from considering what goals are plausible given what S 
and H know about each other. 
Formalizing adequate models of belief and action is a difficult task, but initial attempts have 
been made (e.g. [4,5]) that provide a basis for future work. Our recent efforts in this area will be 
discussed later in the paper. 
This paper summarizes our progress in transforming this theory into a system that actually 
can participate in dialogues. In Section 2, an early implementation by Allen[6] is described 
which produces some helpful responses and is successful in analyzing some noun phrase 
sentence fragments and indirect speech acts. The major deficiencies of this system are 
considered in Section 3: it has no knowledge of discourse structure, which prevents it from 
comprehending extended dialogues, and its representation of actions, beliefs, and time is 
inadequate. These issues are discussed in Sections 4 and 5 respectively. 
One of the major advances made in ARGOT is that it recognizes multiple goals underlying 
utterances. For example, consider the user’s goals underlying utterance (2). From the point of 
view of the task domain, the user’s goal is to get the tape mounted (by means of identifying it). 
From the point of view of the dialogue, the user’s goal is to elaborate on a previous request’s, 
i.e. the user is specifying the value of a parameter in the plan that was recognized from the first 
utterance. In the ARGOT system, we recognize both these goals and are investigating the 
relationship between them. The need for this type of analysis has been pointed out by many 
researchers (e.g. [7-lo]). 
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Given this background, let us consider a simple model of a participant in a dialogue. This 
model was implemented in a system that simulated a clerk in an information booth in a train 
station[6]. The model uses the above theory and outlines four major steps in modeling a 
participant. These are. 
(1) Identify the linguistic actions performed by the speaker using syntactic and semantic 
analysis, taking the utterance literally. 
(2) Recognize at least part of the speaker’s plan by finding an inference path connecting the 
observed linguistic action(s) to an expected goal in the context. 
(3) Choose a set of goals by identifying the key steps in the other’s plan that cannot be 
achieved without assistance (i.e., the obstacles). 
(4) Plan a response that achieves the goals identified in Step (3). 
In the train station dialogues, the goals of the users were assumed to be one of the 
following: 
-boarding a train; 
-meeting an arriving train; 
-other (chosen only if above two are eliminated). 
Let us consider it operating on the simple question 
“When does the Montreal train leave?” 
In Step (l), this was analyzed to be an instance of the action 
User REQUEST that 
System INFORM user of the departure time. 
A simple outline of the plan recognized in Step (2) is shown in Fig. 1. Reading the plan from 
the bottom to the top, we see the following connections, An eventual effect of the user’s 
REQUEST is that the system performs the requested action, namely the INFORM. The effect 
of the INFORM action is that the user will KNOW the departure time. This knowledge is 
necessary for the user to achieve the goal of being at the departure location at the departure 
Y__ _-. 
Fig. 1. The (simplified) plan recognized from “When does the Montreal train leave?” 
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time, which in turn is a prerequisite for boarding the train. Since boarding the train is an 
expected goal in this context, we are done. 
In Step (3), the system examines the user’s plan and finds two obstacies. The first is directly 
on the path outlined above: the user needs to KNOW the departure time. The second is implicit 
from general knowledge about the structure of plans: the user also needs to know the departure 
location. If the context were slightly different, say the station had only one track, then the 
system would have believed that the user already knew the departure location, and thus it 
would not be an obstacle. In this context, however, the system believes that users do not 
generally know this information. The system’s response from Step (4) addresses both these 
goals, and the answer is: 
“4:O0 at gate 7.” 
Thus we have seen how a helpful response can be generated. The exact same mechanism can 
also account for comprehending many indirect speech acts as well as simple noun phrase 
sentence fragments. 
Dialogues 2 and 3 give an indication of these abilities: 
User: The 3: 15 train to Windsor? 
System: Gate 10 
Dialogue 2: A Simple Noun Phrase. 
In Dialogue 2, the user’s utterance is not a complete sentence, yet the noun phrase can be 
analyzed appropriately because the only reasonable plan that involves such a train (in this 
context) is the boarding plan. The answer is generated from the obstacles detected in the plan 
as in the first ‘example. 
User: Do you know when the Rapid0 leaves? 
System: 4:20. 
Dialogue 3: A Simple Indirect Speech Act. 
In Dialogue 3, the user’s utterance is literally a yes/no question, yet “yes” is not an appropriate 
response. The appropriate response results from recognizing that the user has goals that go 
beyond the literal interperation. The plan recognized in this case includes the goal of the user 
knowing the departure time. The most important point to remember in this example is that the 
user’s plan is recognized starting from the literal interpretation of the utterance. The indirect 
interpretation falls out naturally from the plan analysis (see [1 l] for details). 
3. THE ARGOT SYSTEM 
In the current system we are extending the previous work in a number of ways. Most 
importantly, the earlier model has no knowledge of discourse structure, so can not partake in an 
extended ialogue. The only constraints on what is said arise from the structure of the plans 
that are constructed. Also, the parsing model is too weak to analyze any fragments more 
complicated than simple noun phrases. Many sentence fragments are considerably more 
complex than this. Finally, the theoretical work on the formal models of belief, action, goals, 
and plans needs strengthening. 
The architecture of the current system can be motivated best by considering the first 
problem introduced above. Consider the beginning of Dialogue 1: 
User: Could you mount a magtape for me? 
It’s tape xxx. 
The first of these utterances can be analyzed in the old system. Let us assume it is recognized 
as an indirect request and that the user’s goal is to get a magtape mounted, What is the user’s 
goal in the second utterance? From one viewpoint, it is still to get the tape mounted. From 
another viewpoint, however, the important goal to recognize is that this sentence is intended to 
elaborate on the previous request, i.e. it is specifying the value of a parameter in the plan that 
was recognized from the previous utterance. The goals at this level of analysis are only 
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indirectly related to the goal of mounting the tape. Thus we find that there are at least two 
levels of goal analysis that must be considered. Recognition of intention then proceeds at both 
these levels of analysis. 
The two levels that we have identified are the task level, which includes goals such as 
mounting tapes, restoring files, etc. and the communication level, which includes such goals as 
introducing a topic, clarifying or elaborating on a previous utterance, modifying the current 
topic, etc. In the dialogues we consider, the topics generally concern some task that the user 
needs assistance in performing. 
Given this distinction, we can see where other recent dialogue systems fit into this 
framework. The work at SRI[12] in the expert-apprentice dialogues monitored the goals of the 
user at the task level. The only analysis at the communicative goal level was implicit in various 
mechanisms uch as the focusing of attention[l3]. This work ties the task structure and 
communicative structure too closely together for our purposes. 
The work of Mann et al. [14] and Reichman[lS] both can be seen as analyses of the 
communicative goals underlying sentences. Thus these give a clue to the set of high-level goals 
in the communicative goal plan recognition. Neither of these analyses describe in detail the 
process of recognizing the communicative goals from actual utterances. 
The system described in Section 2 and the work at BBN[16] have both levels of analysis but 
collapse them into one level, and thus do not allow knowledge of the dialogue structure to be 
utilized in the analysis. In fact, if we reconsider the analysis made above of the utterance 
“When is the Windsor train?“, we can identify a tension where the two levels interact. In 
particular, all the relationships (i.e. the arcs) in plans arise from a theory of problem solving, 
independent of linguistic actions. Thus we have arcs such as “effect of,” “prerequisite,” “part 
of,” etc. However, there is one class of arcs indicated in the example as “knowledge necessary 
for” arcs. (In[6], these links were introduced by the knowledge inferences, knowif, knowref, 
etc.) These relate steps in a plan to prerequisite knowledge on the part of the actor, but are hard 
to motivate within the general problem solving theory. It is exactly at these links that the 
transition between communicative goals and task goals is made. In the new model the utterance 
“When does the Montreal train leave?” would be recognized at the communicative goal level as 
a bid goal to obtain information (about the departure time). This analysis allows the task level 
analysis to recognize the user’s ultimate goal of boarding the train. 
The overall architecture of the system is depicted in Fig. 2. Included as well is the 
generative side of the system which is not currently being implemented. Each level of analysis 
is considered to be running in parallel, and to be passing partial analyses of the utterances and 
the plans as they are produced. Using this figure, let us consider what the system behavior 
would be if~the user had said only the opening utterance of Dialogue 1. 
The utterance “Could you mount a magtape for me?” could be analyzed at the linguistic 
level as either a yes/no question or an indirect request. The indirect request interpretation arises 
because of the idiomatic nature of the utterance. Note that since the communicative goal 
reasoner is able to take the literal and infer the indirect act as well, the indirect request need not 
be recognized at the linguistic level. These observed linguistic acts are sent to the com- 
municative goal level. Using this input, the communicative goal recognized is a bid goal to 
mount the magtape, which is sent to the task reasoner. The task reasoner analyzes the 
communicative goal and produces a plan for the task. In this simple example, it could simply 
introduce a top level mutual goal of mounting the tape. 
This goal can then be expanded by the task reasoner and the resultant plan inspected for 
obstacles. Assuming the user says nothing further, there is an obstacle in the task plan, for the 
system does not know which tape to mount. This generates a system goal to identify the tape 
parameter, which is sent to the communicative goal reasoner. A speech act (or acts) is planned 
that will lead to accomplishing the goal and which obeys the constraints on well-formed 
discourse. This would be sent to the linguistic level where a response would be generated, such as 
“which tape?” 
The interactions are considerably simplified in the above example. In order to be able to 
recognize sentence fragments, and to recognize linguistic clues as to the discourse structure, the 
parser must send partial descriptions as the utterance is being analyzed. Example messages 
could be “a noun phrase referring to a tape was mentioned,” or “the utterance was preceded 
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with a ‘but”’ (indicating topic change). One design objective is to make it possible for the 
system to generate a reasonable response even if the parser fails to generate a complete 
analysis of the utterances. To allow such behavior we view each of the levels of analysis as 
running in parallel. In the implementation, each level is implemented by one or more processes 
and the levels interact using message passing (e.g.[17]). Thus, although we have separated out 
various stages of analysis, the utterances are not processed by one stage at a time in sequence. 
In the actual dialogue we saw the user identify the tape before the system had a chance (or 
possibly realized the need!) to generate a request o identify it. It is not plausible to allow the 
system to ignore such new information and generate the response anyway. On the other hand, 
some system responses, especially those that correct a bad assumption on the part of the user, 
should be generated anyway and the input effectively ignored. To make such a decision the 
system needs to know both the import of the user’s new utterance and the goals underlying its 
response to the original utterance. 
Our initial solution to this problem is to have the linguistic generation level check with the 
task level just before the response is actually generated to see if the goal that motivated the 
response is still valid. Thus the task level of the system is responsible for some coordination of 
behavior between the other levels. This of course, makes the processing speed an important 
aspect of the model. If utterances are presented too rapidly, they will not be fully compre- 
hended. If they are presented too slowly, the system will generate many requests for elabora- 
tion and clarification. These issues have not been investigated extensively at this stage, but will 
eventually be a major area of research. 
Finally, each module is connected to a knowledge of base of facts. We have developed a 
representation language which is a variant of the first order predicate calculus (FOPC) that 
allows knowledge to be structured in a manner akin to semantic networks. Associated with the 
representation is a specialized limited inference mechanism that mimics the role of a network 
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matcher and provides the system with general inference behavior such as the inheritance of 
properties and limited reasoning about coreference, time, and beliefs. This will be considered in 
detail in Section 5. 
4.COMMUNICATlVEFOAL REASONING 
Given that the new system splits the analyses of intention into two levels, the question 
arises as to what are the high-level goals at each, and how do they relate to each other. The 
high-level goals at the task level are dependent on the domain, but correspond to the gigh-level 
goals in the earlier system. The high-level communicative goals were not present previously, 
and must satisfy two constraints. First, they must reflect the structure of English dialogue. 
Second, though, they must be useful as input to the task level reasoner. In other words, they 
must specify some operation (e.g. introduce goal, specify parameter) that indicates how the task 
level plan is to be manipulated. 
Our initial set of high-level communicative goals is based on the work of Mann, Moore and 
Levin[ll]. In their model, conversations are analyzed in terms of the manipulation of goals in 
the task domain. Thus, typical communicative goals are reflected by the actions: 
Bid-Goal-introduction of a task goal for adoption by the hearer; 
Accept-Goal-acceptance by the hearer of a bid goal; 
Parameter Specification-identification of a parameter in an already accepted task; 
Termination-end of a discussion and pursuit of an already accepted goal. 
These are suitable for our analysis, for each specifies ome specific operation that the task level 
reasoner should perform. Of course, since the task level reasoner is a general plan recognizer as 
well, it may infer beyond the immediate ffect of the specific communicative action inferred at 
any one stage. For example, if a goal is bid to mount a tape, the system might infer that the user 
has a higher-level goal of restoring a file, or possibly backing up a file. 
We have specified these comunicative goals as actions in our plan model, outlining their 
prerequisites, effects, and methods for accomplishing them. These tie in with the speech act 
analysis in the original system easily. Thus, using the same plan recognition algorithm as before, 
we can recognize the communicative goals. 
Not all of these communicative actions are possible at any given time. For instance, at the 
start of a dialogue, one may either bid a goal or get the other agent’s attention (a summons). In 
order to capture this knowledge we have a context-free grammar which has these com- 
municative acts as terminals, along the lines of Horrigan[lS]. The grammar indicates what acts 
are legal at any particular time for both participants. In order to produce such a grammar, we 
needed to extend the set of communicative acts to include acts such as summoning attention, 
acknowledgments, etc. which are included in[l8]. This model is currently being implemented 
and tested on some sample dialogues, including Dialogue 1. We are currently considering 
incorporating a more general model of discourse that can handle a wider range of dialogues, 
including topic change, clarification dialogues, and repair. 
One of the successes of the previous system is that some utterances consisting of a single 
noun phrase can be understood appropriately. The context is sufficient o identify one plausible 
plan for the speaker. We hope to extend this success to ungrammatical utterances. As the 
linguistic analysis progresses, the linguistic level can notify the communicative goal level of the 
various noun phrases that appear as they are analyzed. This allows the other levels to start 
analyzing the speaker’s intentions before the entire sentence is linguistically analyzed. Thus, 
sometimes an interpretation may be found even if the linguistic analysis eventually “fails” to 
find a complete sentence. (Failure is not quite the correct word here, since if the utterance is 
understood, whether it was “correct” or not becomes less relevant.) 
In addition, the rest of the system may be able to provide the linguistic level with strong 
enough expectations as to the content of the utterance that is able to construct a plausible 
analysis of what was said. 
We are currently investigating what other partial information could be useful for the 
communicative goal recognizer. One area that is obvious is the recognition of clue words to the 
discourse structure[ 151. For example, if the next user utterance begins with the word “but”, 
this gives a clue as to what communicative goal the user is performing. In particular, the 
system should expect the user to modify the current topic in some way. Similarly, if an 
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utterance contains the word “please,” then the intent behind the utterance will involve a request 
at some level of analysis. 
S.ISSUES IN KNOWLEDGEREPRESENTATION 
One of the more important first tasks in designing a system is to specify a system-wide 
language in which facts could be expressed and transmitted in messages. One of the 
methodological goals in this development has been not to introduce any constructs into this 
language until they were rigorously defined. We started with a standard version of the first 
order predicate calculus and have since introduced notational abbreviations and defined a wide 
range of predicates at two separate levels of analysis. The first level, corresponding to the 
epistemological level in[16], consists of predicates that are used to define the structure of 
knowledge. The initial set of these has been determined by investigating what types of 
inferences we want to be able to do efficiently and automatically. Given these predicates and 
the set of desired inferences, we have defined a retrieval component acting on a knowledge 
base of facts. The current retriever implements inferences uch as those that produce semantic 
network-like inheritance of properties. This work is considered in more detail in Section 5.1. 
The other level of analysis corresponds to the conceptual level of [16]. At this level we have 
outlined basic theories of the structure of actions, events, plans, times, and beliefs. Using these 
theories, we then have specified hierarchies of actions and events, eventually arriving at 
predicates that are specific to the domain being modeled. Some of the theoretical underpinnings 
of this work are outlined in Section 5.2. 
5.1 The epistemological primitives and the retriever 
Ever since Woods’s[l9] “What’s in a Link” paper, there has been a growing concern for 
formalization in the study of knowledge representation. Several arguments have been made that 
frame representation languages and semantic-network languages are syntactic variants of the 
first-order predicate calculus (FOPC). The typical argument (e.g. [20,21]) proceeds by showing 
how any given frame or network representation can be mapped to a logically isomorphic (i.e. 
logically equivalent when the mapping between the two notations is accounted for) FOPC 
representation. We emphasize the term “logically isomorphic” because these arguments have 
primarily dealt with the content (semantics) of the representations rather than their forms 
(syntax). Though these arguments are valid and scientifically important, there is another side to 
the story. 
For the past two years we have been studying the formalization of knowledge retrievers as 
well as the representation languages that they operate on. This study has led to the conclusion 
that the form of a representation is crucial to the design of a retriever. We are designing a 
representation language in the notation of FOPC whose form facilitates the design of a 
semantic-network-like retriever. 
Elsewhere[22], we have demonstrated the utility of viewing a knowledge retriever as a 
specialized inference engine (theorem prover). A specialized inference engine is tailored to treat 
certain predicate, function, and constant symbols differently than others. This is done by 
building into the inference engine certain true sentences involving these symbols and the 
control needed to handle these sentences. The inference engine must also be able to recognize 
when it is able to use its specialized machinery. That is, its specialized knowledge must be 
coupled to the form of the situations that it can deal with. 
For illustration, consider an instance of the ubiquitous type hierarchies of semantic 
networks: 
FORDS 
/ subtype 
MUSTANGS 
I type 
OLDIiLACK 
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By considering the types FORDS and MUSTANGS to be predicates, the following two FOPC 
sentences are logically isomorphic to the network: 
(1.) V x MUSTANGS( x ) + FORDS( x ) 
(1.2) MUSTANGS(OLD-BLACK) 
However, these two sentences have not captured the form of the network, and furthermore, not 
doing so is problematic to the design of a retriever. The subtype and type links have been built 
into the network language because the network retriever has been built to handle them 
specially. That is, the retriever does not view a subtype link as an arbitrary implication such as 
(1.1) and it does not view a type link as an arbitrary atomic sentence such as (1.2). Rather, they 
are recognized specially and enable specialized inferences. 
In our representation language we capture the form as well as the content of the network. 
By introducing two predicates, TYPE and SUBTYPE, we capture the meaning of the type and 
subtype links. TYPE(i, t) is true iff the individual u is a member of the type (set of objects) t, 
and SUBTYPE(f,, f3) is true iff the type t, is a subtype (subset) of the type t? Thus, in our 
language, the following two sentences would be used to represent what was intended by the 
network: 
(2.1) SUBTYPE(FORDS, MUSTANGS) 
(2.2) TYPE(OLD-BLACK, FORDS) 
It is now easy to build a retriever that recognizes ubtype and type assertions by matching 
predicate names. Contrast this to the case where the representation language used (1.1) and 
(1.2) and the retriever would have to recognize these as sentences to be handled in a special 
manner. 
But what must the retriever know about the SUBTYPE and TYPE predicates in order that 
it can reason (make inferences) with them? There are two assertions, (A.l) and (A.2), such that 
((1.1) (1.2)) is logically isomorphic to {(2.1), (2.2), (A.l), (A.2)). (Note: throughout his paper, 
axioms that define the retriever’s capabilities will be specially labeled A.l, A.2, etc.) 
(A.l) Vr,, tz, t3 SUBTYPE(f,, tz) A SUBTYPE&, f,)+SUBTYPE(f,, fJ 
(SUBTYPE is transitive.) 
(A.2) VO, t,, tz TYPE(0, t,) A SUBTYPE(f,, fJ+TYPE(O, fJ 
(Every member of a given type is a member of its supertypes.) 
The retriever will also need to know how to control inferences with these axioms, but this issue 
is not taken up in this paper. 
The design of a semantic-network language often continues by introducing new kinds of 
nodes and links into the language. This process may terminate with a fixed set of node and link 
types that are the knowledge-structuring primitives out of which all representations are built. 
Others have referred to these knowledge-structuring primitives as epistemological 
primitives[l6] and structural relations[23]. If a fixed set of knowledge-structuring primitives is 
used in the language, then a retriever can be built that knows how to deal with all of them. 
The design of our representation language very much mimics this approach. Our knowledge- 
structuring rimitives include a fixed set of predicate names and terms denoting three kinds of 
elements in the domain. We give meaning to these primitives by writing domain-independent 
axioms involving them. A retriever has been built that reasons with these axioms and thus 
knows how to deal with all the primitives of our language. Thus far in this paper we have 
introduced two predicates (TYPE and SUBTYPE), two kinds of elements (individuals and 
types), and two axioms ((A.]) and (A.2)). 
This type of analysis can be continued to introduce roles, distinguished types, and limited 
forms of equality (see [24]). 
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The important point to notice here is that once we have selected our predicates and given 
the axioms defining them, we have a precise characterization of what inferences we would like 
the retrieval component o perform. We have used this approach to define a prototype 
knowledge base retrieval mechanism that is currently being used in the system. It is im- 
plemented in a Horn clause theorem prover and has approximately the same capabilities as the 
partitioned networks of Hendrix[ZS], and makes retrievals reasonably efficiently. 
5.2 Formal aspects of the conceptual level of representation 
An important part of this research over the last two years has been the investigation of some 
basic issues in representation. In particular, the existing models of action have proven 
inadequate to represent many of the concepts talked about in even simple dialogues, as well as 
being inadequate for a more general plan reasoning. This problem has mainly been caused by an 
inadequate treatment of time in existing knowledge representations. The other major problem 
has been the precise specification of a representation of belief that did not lead to theoretical 
difficulties. Progress has been made on all of these issues. 
An interval-based temporal ogic has been defined[26] and is currently being incorporated 
into our knowledge representation. Relationships between intervals are maintained in a hierar- 
chical manner and an inference process based on constraint propagation has been developed 
and implemented. This representation is notable in a few areas: 
-It allows one to efficiently represent he present moment (i.e. “now”) so that it can be 
continually updated without making major changes to the knowledge base. 
-It is designed using relative information about how intervals are related. Thus it doesn’t 
depend on a date line which is often found in temporal representations. This is particularly 
important in a dialogue system for most temporal information does not have a precise time. 
-It allows time intervals to extend indefinitely into the past or future, and supports a 
limited type of default reasoning. 
This representation of time has been used to produce a general model of events and 
actions[27]. Rather than concentrating on how actions are performed, as is done in the 
problem-solving literature, this work examines the set of conditions under which an action or 
event can be said to have occurred. In other words, if one is told that action A occurred, what 
can be inferred about the state of the world? 
Consider an example investigated in detail in[27]. What are the conditions under which one 
might say that an actor hid a book from another actor? Certainly, this can’t be answered in 
terms of the physical actions the actor did, for the actor might have hidden the book by 
-putting it behind a desk: 
-standing between it and the other agent while they are in the same room; or 
-calling a friend and getting him to do one of the above. 
Furthermore, the actor might hide the object by simply not doing something s/he intended to 
do. For example, assume Sam is planning to go to lunch with Carole after picking Carole up at 
her office. If, on the way out of his office, Sam decides not to take his coat because he doesn’t 
want Carole to see it, then Sam has hidden the coat from Carole. Of course, it is crucial here 
that Sam believe that he normally would have taken the coat. Sam couldn’t have hidden his 
coat by forgetting to bring it. 
This example brings up a few key points that may not be noticed from the first three 
examples. First, Sam must have intended that Carole not see the coat. Without this intention 
(i.e., in the forgetting case), no such action occurs. Second, Sam must have believed that it was 
likely that Carole would see the coat in the future course of events. Finally, Sam must have 
acted in such a way that he then believed that Carole would not see the coat in the future 
course of events. Of course, in this case, the action Sam performed was “not bringing the 
coat,” which would normally not be considered an action unless it was intentionally not done. 
I claim that these three conditions provide a reasonably accurate definition of what it means 
to hide something. They certainly cover the examples presented above. It is also important o 
note that one does not have to be successful in order to have been hiding something. The 
definition depends on what the hider believes and intends at the time, not what actually occurs. 
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However, the present definition is rather unsatisfactory, as many extremely difficult concepts, 
such as belief and intention, have been thrown about casually. 
In the last two years, we have developed a model of belief by viewing BELIEVE as a 
predicate between an agent and a description of a sentence. To do this, we must introduce 
quotation into the logic. Thus the assertion “John believes Sam lives on 4th Street” would be 
expressed as 
BELIEVE(JOHN, “LIVES(SAM, 4th STREET)“). 
Introducing quotation into a logic does not cause any difficulties until one tries to relate the 
quoted formula to the formula it names. To do this, we need a truth predicate, and an axiom 
such as: for any sentence (Y 
(*) TR(“q”)( = )(Y. 
Thus. 
TR(“LIVES(SAM, 4th STREET)“) ( = ) LIVES(SAM, 4th STREET). 
Unfortunately, such an axiom leads to paradoxes. Perlis[28], however, has shown that one can 
define a truth scheme that intuitively gives us the behavior above but which is provably 
consistent. There is not the space to examine this here, but suffice to say that (*) does not get us 
into trouble unless (Y contains a negation outside a “Tr” predicate. 
Using this formalism, we can safely introduce the BELIEVE predicate and examine its 
behavior. One of the initial difficulties concerns representing the fact that someone knows 
something that the believer does not know. For instance, if it is not known where Sam lives, we 
would still like to be able to represent he fact that John knows where Sam lives. This is 
typically handled by quantifying in. Thus we get a formula such as 
(**) 3 x BELIEVE(JOHN, “LIVES(SAM, X )“). 
I have been deliberately loose here about quotation. Actually the variable x ranges over 
quoted expressions and must not be quoted. So we need a more elaborate quotation scheme 
that gives us the abilities of Quine’s corner quotes. Leaving these details aside, however, the 
above formula does not capture the required knowiedge. Presumably, everyone believe that 
Sam lives where Sam lives, so the description “‘the place where Sam lives” satisfies(**) but 
does not capture that John knows where Sam lives. 
One way out of this problem is to assume there is a standard name for every object (e.g. 
Moore[29]). This is inadequate, however, for the name that will satisfy the above knowledge 
changes as the context changes. For example, if John were a customs officer at the border, the 
description “Rochester” would be enough to claim that John knows where Sam lives. If John 
were a friend going to Sam’s house, however, directions to the house (e.g. an address) would be 
required. Thus to solve this problem we need to be able to assert what descriptions are useful 
for what task, and then knowing what something is depends on what task is being considered. 
Within a logic with quotation, however, predicates that operate on the syntactic form of 
formulas are perfectly acceptable, and one can specify exactly what form of description is 
necessary for any task. Thus for JOHN the customs officer at the border, he knows where Sam 
lives if 
3 x BELIEVE(JOHN, “LIVES(SAM, x )“) 6r CITY-NAME( x ) 
where CITY-NAME is a predicate on expressions and is true if x is the proper name of a city. 
The interested reader should see [30] for further details. 
One problem with quotation schemes that it also solved by Haas is that if one simulates 
another’s reasoning by simulating inference rules on syntactic formulas, the length of the 
simulation with respect to the simulated reasoning grows exponentially with the depth of 
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dummy constants along the lines of [31], we can 
handle the quantifying in case. Haas[30] presents a rigorous treatment of these issues. Since the 
simulation technique is just another proof rule in a general inference system, disjunctions can 
be handled using the standard techniques. 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The ARGOT project is still in its infancy. Simple prototypes of the task level reasoner, 
communicative goal reasoner, and the knowledge base have been constructed, and more 
sophisticated versions are under development. Within the next few years we hope to under- 
stand the relationship between knowledge of discourse structure and the process of plan 
recognition, and to develop more sophisticated plan recognition methods based on o.ur work in 
the representation of belief, action, and time. We consider these to be two major steps towards 
constructing truly conversant systems. 
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